Keynote Address by Mr K Shanmugam at the Singapore Global Dialogue Opening Gala Dinner

Synopsis:

In his speech to the Singapore Global Dialogue, Minister Shanmugam spoke, among others, of dealing effectively with religious extremism.

Singapore Global Dialogue Opening Gala Dinner at Shangri-La Hotel - Keynote Address by Mr K Shanmugam, Minister for Law and Second Minister for Home Affairs, 23 September 2010

Your Excellency, President S R Nathan

Ambassador Barry Desker,
Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of Int’l Studies

Mr S Dhanabalan, Chairman Temasek Holdings

Distinguished Guests

This Conference deals with a subject which has become a core issue for many of us. There has been a continuing rise of threats to security both globally and in this region and, as a result, countries have had to examine and re-examine their responses.

As most of us are aware security challenges – come in many different forms. Natural disasters, political instability, viruses which mutate, cyber threats and so on.

I understand that other speakers will be discussing issues tomorrow, such as the future of global governance, the role of resurgent powers, strategic challenges facing the region, and emerging transnational threats.

Tonight, I will focus on, one particular challenge that has received the most attention in recent years – Jihadist terrorism. Firstly, I will set out our perspective on the nature of the Jihadist threat in this region. Secondly, many countries, including the United States, Australia and others, have actively helped countries in this region to counter such terrorism. I will share some thoughts on how this assistance can be effectively directed and channeled.

Jihadist ideology has grown in this region because of Al Qaeda and its effective propaganda. U.S. and allied operations over the years have significantly reduced Al Qaeda’s ability to launch large attacks. But attacks continue to occur from time to time - this reflects the resilience of regional jihadist networks which Al Qaeda has inspired. Its propaganda has been effective.

Regional terror networks show commitment to a global jihadist agenda, in addition to their own separatist causes. They have adopted the Al Qaeda ideology but operate independently without having to always rely on Al Qaeda.

Al Qaeda knows the importance of this ideological reach and propaganda. As such, even when under pressure, it has invested resources to expand the use of Internet propagandists who speak English and other languages, and has developed its online reach to target larger audiences.

Let me turn to Southeast Asia in this context.

The main Jihadist Group in Southeast Asia is the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI. Its ideology is to have a Caliphate stretching across Malaysia, Indonesia, and to parts of the Philippines. It will cover much of the Southeast Asian Archipelago. In Southeast Asia, several countries have faced terrorist threats.

We start with Thailand. There has been an ethnic insurgency in the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Militants have claimed more than 4,000 lives since the campaign escalated in January 2004. The general assessment is that this insurgency remains localized, and driven by Pattani Malay nationalism, as distinct from the jihadist ideology of the likes of Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. But that can change easily.

If you turn to the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group or ASG for short and Moro Islamic Liberation Front or MILF are Muslim-based and they seek greater self-rule for Filipino Muslims. Insurgency and unrest is simmering unresolved in Southern Philippines - in Basilan, Mindanao, and the Sulu Archipelago.

In Malaysia, in January this year, the Malaysian government announced that 10 men were arrested for “posing serious security concerns”. The men are believed to be linked to a wider international network. They include two from Nigeria, four from Syria, and one each from Yemen and Jordan.

Turning to Indonesia, since the last Bali bombing in 2005, there were no major attacks until July of last year. Then you have two attacks on Jakarta hotels, the Marriott and Ritz Carlton. They were carried out by a splinter group under Noordin Top – who was one of the most wanted men in the region.

The attacks on the two hotels show sophistication in planning (bombs were smuggled into hotel via a staff entrance), continued desire for mass casualties, and the use of insiders for example the hotel florist.

Groups in Indonesia have been able to recruit new members through some Islamic schools, controlled by their sympathisers. These schools taught a militant curriculum of extremist ideas and doctrines.

There have been various incidents since July 2009. Today’s newspapers, for example, reported the gunning down of 3 police officers by 10 gunmen, in apparent retaliation for anti-terrorism raids. It can be said that the main locus of the terror network and activity in the region, is situated in Indonesia. Despite this, it must be added however that Indonesia remains a tolerant country committed to the official state philosophy of Pancasila.

The Indonesia network centres mainly around the residual elements of the JI organisation. There are three levels of this network. At one level, there are leaders who have been and are operating in the open, running legal organizations - including schools and political associations, they groom the next cohort of militants. At a second level, new operational cells are being formed which are capable of carrying out attacks. And at the third level, sympathisers within local communitiesoffer safe refuge to militants and fugitives, act as guides and sometimes arrange for travel of jihadists through Southeast Asia. These sympathisers may not necessarily be JI members.

Then you turn to Singapore - A small dot, an oasis of calm, subject of some interest to those who wish to form the Caliphate. Seen as close to the United States, Singapore has military personnel in Afghanistan, and we provide military facilities for the United States. We obviously have to be alert. So when people tell us: “Why do you worry? Everything is so peaceful here.” We realise that they don’t have the full picture of the region.

As can be seen, terror threats in this region are a serious issue. It is useful to consider some of the challenges in effectively dealing with these networks in the region.

One difficult challenge is the long porous coastlines in Southeast Asian Archipelago. The capacity to effectively police these long coastlines and movements of persons across them varies from country to country. Militants have been able to move fairly easily across countries, to take refuge, plan attacks and then move in to attack. For example, it has been possible to travel freely using the Celebes Sea between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. “Military Review” (May-June 2010) reported “terrorists can move between training areas in Mindanao while returning to or transiting from Indonesia and Malaysia en route to other destinations [via this Celebes route]. This freedom of movement enables them to blend with the general population or form networks with other illegal elements to facilitate the flow of persons, weapons, and communication”.

These long coastlines have allowed trade to flourish in this region for several centuries The irony is that militants now use them as well, two examples will illustrate this.

Many of you would have heard of Hambali, he was a dangerous militant. The US reportedly paid as much as US$10 million as a reward for him. According to reports, he used a series of safe-houses throughout Southeast Asia, especially Thailand and Cambodia to move around. He was finally arrested by the Thai authorities.

Dulmatin was another very dangerous militant. He fled Indonesia after the 2002 Bali bombing and took refuge in the South Philippines for several years. He consorted with MILF and Abu Sayaf elements. Around 2007, he managed to return to Indonesia undetected, and set up a JI-led training facility in Aceh. He was killed in Pamulang, the outskirts of Jakarta, by the Indonesian authorities in March 2010.

There are several other examples. The JI has also been able to secure access to training bases with the MILF and Abu Sayaf in Mindanao. A large cell in Aceh was recently uncovered by Indonesia. The aim was to set up a training base for many of the militants in the region and was intended as a collaboration between Indonesian and Filipino militants.

That is the first challenge. The second challenge is jihadism gets funded across borders, internationally.

There are many routes by which militant operations are financed, for example, the hawala system, movement of money by couriers, diversion of charity proceeds, and proceeds of crime. And it costs very little to fund attacks.

Investigations in Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia reveal ties between Al Qaeda and JI, which has helped in the transfer of ideology and finance from the Middle East to Asia. Jakarta Post last year reported that: “the majority of overseas funding for a string of terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including July 2009 twin hotel bombings in Jakarta, came from the Middle East”.

Various charities and non-governmental organisations are also believed to have provided financing to militants. In some cases, legitimate charities were penetrated by jihadists or their sympathisers, who then diverted some of the funds to militant organisations.

Third challenge that is faced in this region is the spread of Jihadist terrorist ideology. It is sweeping through the world, available on the Internet; and available to an Internet savvy generation. And you have charismatic speakers who preach in English and other languages, like Al-awlaki whom many of you would have heard, and also Feiz Muhammad, who is based in Australia.

Jihadist ideology has also been propagated by some extremist religious schools and scholars, who are sympathetic to militant causes. These have been aided by inadequate mechanisms within some regional countries to monitor and effectively deal with the spread of such ideology.

Beyond these specific challenges is a general challenge: that of good governance.

A common factor is that a section of the population in this region lives in fairly difficult conditions. There are social and economic inequalities, inadequate access to education, healthcare and other public goods. Some countries in the region don’t rank too well when measured against international norms on prevalence of corruption, access to justice, rule of law, and law and order. The list goes on.

These are basic governance issues and not necessarily the causes of terrorism. But the mix provides fertile ground for recruiting would-be militants.

We can list these challenges and more. The key question for opinion makers and for countries which want to focus on helping this region is: “How can you help this region fight the militant threat effectively?” There are some things that can be done.

The first and most obvious is kinetic - strengthening the counter terrorism capabilities of the agencies in the region. One of the lessons from the Malayan Emergency, ending in 1960, was that countries must seek to ensure that official policies and behaviour of police and troops should not undercut the official line or further alienate the target or the wider community. The principle of minimum force in counter-insurgency operations, to avoid collateral damage, is thus of great importance. But the appropriate and effective use of force is essential in addressing a violent threat.

Foreign partners in counter terrorism have provided regional countries with valuable assistance and advice on operational aspects. This has helped to raise the professionalism of security forces in the region. Detachment 88 in Indonesia, for example, has had outstanding successes. It has had more than 400 terrorists arrested, including the arrest of 102 terror suspects in the aftermath of their raid on an Aceh jihadist training camp earlier this year.

Detachment 88 has been responsible for the elimination of several key militants, including master bomb-maker Dr. Azahari bin Husin in November 2005, the arrest of Abu Dujana in 2007, the elimination of Noordin Mohammed Top in Sept 2009 – who as I said earlier was one of the most wanted men in the region, and Dulmatin in March 2010.

Agencies in the region will benefit from the right type of assistance – in upgrading their capabilities. This requires continued attention.

The kinetic response is one aspect. Having a proper legal regime for dealing with a captured terrorist is a second aspect, but this does not however get the attention that it should.

Consider this: terrorists get picked up, what do you do with them after that?

You can treat it as a law and order issue, but that is clearly not optimal. There are difficulties with trial process, getting witnesses to testify, the weaknesses in the judicial system in some places. Witnesses will too often be terrified to testify. There will be difficulties with proving a case beyond reasonable doubt, in open court, given that the ringleaders would have insulated themselves. Revealing evidence which the intelligence agencies would have obtained is also often undesirable. There are many other difficulties.

A second approach is to hold the detainees without a clear legal framework. That makes rehabilitation much more difficult and creates a sense that the State itself is acting outside the law.

Or third, have a legal framework for detention without trial. Singapore adopts this approach. This requires acceptance that the standard trial process is not the optimal solution. The Executive has to be given the power to detain, with some safeguards and review. But for this to work there has to be an acceptance by the people that the Executive power will not be abused. The Government has to command the confidence of the people.

There are no easy answers in this area but this is something on which there can be more discussion. The international community can give more thought on how countries in this region can be assisted to develop a legal framework to detain terrorists.

A third aspect, which again should get more attention, is the rehabilitation of detainees.

The radical ideas of detainees have to be corrected. It is like defusing a human bomb. Without rehabilitation, the choices really are to retain indefinitely, or to release them after a period with a high risk of recidivism.

We have to be clear. Our own approach in Singapore is that they have to be detained as long as they pose any threat. We don’t take chances on that. The primary responsibility of the Government is to ensure security, but it is good to have a process whereby at least some of them can be rehabilitated, where possible.

If the detainees are not properly segregated and no attempt is made to rehabilitate them then the prisons in fact become recruiting ground where the detained jihadists influence other prisoners.

Indonesian security observers have suggested that factors which facilitate radicalisation in prison include:-

(i) inadequate segregation of radical elements from the rest of the prison population.
(ii) allowing convicts serving time for terrorism-related offences to actually manage prison mosque facilities, which has happened.
(iii) making use of prison mosques, to preach their radical ideology and recruit new members.
(iv) unmoderated access to external religious teachers, via cell phone, who continue to preach radical ideology to inmates.
(v) relative ease of finding, duplicating and discussing reading materials about jihad, inside prisons.

There is a need to separate the ideologically motivated, and then work with them. Without rehabilitation, risk of recidivism is also high. Jakarta Post reported earlier this year that “more than 450 (Indonesian) terror suspects have been charged or tried in courts of law on terrorism charges, 200 of whom were released after serving sentences; but these men are prone to recidivism”.

We run a programme which has been noted by scholars in this field.

We have a group, the Religious Rehabilitation Group or RRG formed in 2003. It is made up of a voluntary group of Islamic scholars and teachers operating in their personal capacities. Their primary focus is to perform religious counseling work on detained JI members.

An important feature of the rehabilitation programme is to get the detainees to really understand and appreciate Islam and counter their misperceptions about the religion. The efforts of the RRG have been highlighted in various international conferences and media over the years. The Washington Post ran an article under the title “Best Guide for Gitmo? Look to Singapore”.

The key to success of such a program is that the group is formed by the Islamic Community, the group has credentials and proper religious authority, and the members volunteer their services and work in a comprehensive way with the detainees.

At the end, the security agencies make the assessment: do the detainees continue to pose a threat? That will be a judgment call.

If a detainee is assessed to be a threat, he will continue to be detained. But those who want to and can reform will get a chance to lead a new life.

A fourth aspect of dealing with the challenges is to deal with clerics of any religion who preach extremist ideology or intolerance.

The traditional options have been either to treat it as a freedom of speech issue, to wait until there is some actual incitement of violence. Our view is that this is not satisfactory, particularly in this region that consists of multi-religious, multi-ethnic societies. Race and religion are emotive issues, and have led to a lot of bloodshed. Considerable harm can be done to the fabric of society through intolerant preaching. That’s a greater risk than the curtailment of freedom of speech.

If we approach this question without ideological bias, then there is a case for early intervention – to prevent religion from being used as a political tool, or being used to radicalise.

And our model in Singapore is that the Government is given the power to make a restraining order against any cleric if his actions have or are likely to cause tensions between different religious groups, or use religion for extremist activities. The Philosophy really is that clerics of any faith should stick to preaching the virtues of their religion, and not preach hate towards others. The secular authorities must be able to intervene to stop clerics if they did preach intolerance or violence.

So for example, if anyone wanted to burn the Quran or the Bible, he or she could be prevented from doing so, by way of restraining order, rather than having to wait for breach of some fire safety code.

Finally, the issue of governance. Effective governance, and dealing with local grievances will help.

One example is the issue of Madrasahs. Many of you would have heard of Madrasahs in some countries which radicalise children – these schools become recruiting centres for jihadism. They get students for example by providing free food. That is attractive to poor families. Proper economic development and the provision of good education by the State can help counter the influence of such radical schools.

There is a need to focus on a whole array of governance issues. It would be hugely helpful if opinion makers who comment on this region focused a little bit more on governance and what can be done to improve governance, rather than on somewhat sterile indices of press freedom or on outward forms of democracy.

My central point is that there has been a lot of attention in helping develop counter-terrorism capabilities in this region, but attention must also be paid to a whole set of issues, ranging from dismantling terror outfits, to rehabilitation of detainees, to tackling socio-economic issues which provide fertile ground for recruitment of would-be terrorists.

Engagement on such a scale requires serious commitment and serious effort. The jihadist problem will be a difficult one to eliminate, and the region’s militants can create problems internationally. Continued high level engagement is needed to deal with these issues. The effort cannot be subject to election cycles and differing priorities.

The International Crisis Group has commented as follows, and I quote: “Preventing recruitment is more than publishing books with alternative interpretations of jihad and more than interfaith dialogues. It involves offering different life options and career choices to students in radical (sic) schools... It involves teaching tolerance in elementary schools, so values that militate against extremism are inculcated at an early age. Terrorism is not going to be eradicated any time soon, but there is still much that the government, civil society and the private sector can do.”

Let me conclude by saying this: the primary responsibility for countering terrorism has to lie with each country in this region. We take that approach, and we take counter-terrorism seriously.

But America and its friends, acting in their own enlightened self-interest, can help regional countries in the fight against terrorism, in several ways beyond the strengthening of the kinetic abilities of the regional agencies.

Thank you.